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HIS Article reviews case law developments in the areas of wills,
nontestamentary transfers, intestate succession, estate administra-
tion, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey period covers deci-
sions published between October 1, 1995, and September 30, 1996.
I. WILLS
A. WILL CONTESTS
In Richardson v. Laney' the court found that sufficient evidence ex-
isted to support the jury's determination that a co-executor named in the
decedent's will had a conflict of interest with the estate.2 The decedent
executed a will several years prior to his death, in which he named one of
his sons and his daughter as co-executors. After the decedent became ill
he transferred some of his property to this son and daughter. Following
the decedent's death the decedent's other son and a grandson, who were
two of the other beneficiaries of his will, attempted to probate a copy of
* B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas; Of Counsel, Bourland, Smith, Wall & Wenzel, Fort
Worth, Texas.
1. 911 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ). For a discussion of other
issues in this case see infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
2. Id. at 492.
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the will, alleging that the original was lost. They also asked to be named
independent co-executors of the will instead of the son and daughter
named because of a conflict of interest. The son named as co-executor
then offered the original will for probate and filed an opposition to the
other application. At trial the jury found that the son named as co-execu-
tor in the will had a conflict of interest with the estate. The jury based its
finding upon evidence that the son withdrew estate funds and deposited
them into his personal account, used estate funds to pay his personal bills,
used a truck belonging to the estate without paying for the use, removed
personal property from the decedent's home, and, although he alleged
that the decedent had given him the home, paid utility bills for the home
from estate funds. The son claimed that he kept records concerning these
matters, but he did not offer the records into evidence. The son con-
tended on appeal that the other beneficiaries had the burden of proving
that he did not keep records. The appeals court disagreed, stating that
the other beneficiaries merely had the burden of proving that the son did
not reimburse the estate, and that they met their burden of proof.3
In Tieken v. Midwestern State University4 the court determined that the
testator lacked testamentary capacity5 and that the testator executed the
will as the result of undue influence. 6 The appellant became friendly with
the testator and her husband several years before their deaths. The testa-
tor and her husband executed wills, in which they benefited Midwestern
State University on the death of the second of them to die, approximately
four years after the appellant met them. The testator and her husband
later executed codicils in which they named another friend to serve as
independent executor of their wills, and they later gave the other friend
their powers of attorney. The testator's husband died in 1986. The testa-
tor had been in poor health prior to her husband's death, and her health
continued to decline. The appellant moved the testator to a nursing
home, and the testator soon thereafter revoked the power of attorney
and granted a new power of attorney to the appellant. Several months
later the testator executed a new will, in which she left a significant part
of her estate to the appellant, as well as making gifts to two charities not
named in her earlier will. Following the testator's death, the attorney
who drafted the new will offered it for probate and the friend named as
independent executor in the earlier will contested the new will. The jury
found that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when she executed
the new will after considering evidence that the testator took medication
that caused hallucinations, the testator was disoriented and had memory
problems, the testator had medical problems that affected her memory,
and the testator had a short attention span. The appeals court found that
the jury had some evidence to support its finding of lack of testamentary
3. Id.
4. 912 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
5. Id. at 884.
6. Id. at 886.
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capacity 7 and that the jury's finding was not against the preponderance of
the evidence. 8 The appeals court further found that evidence existed to
support the jury's finding that the appellant and another person exerted
undue influence over the testator.9 The appeals court also held that the
appellant's contention that Midwestern State University was a contestant
in the will contest because it contributed to the original contestant's legal
fees was moot.' 0
In Orozco v. Orozco"x the court held that the testator's mark on the
will met the requirements of Probate Code section 5912 for a validly exe-
cuted will.13 The court also held that sufficient evidence existed to sup-
port the jury's finding that the testator actually placed her mark on the
will.14 The testator suffered from severe rheumatoid arthritis, which,
among other things, prevented her from signing her name. While in the
hospital and shortly before surgery, the testator met with her attorney
concerning her new will. The attorney prepared the will and the testator
executed the will by placing her mark in the presence of two witnesses,
the notary public, and her attorney. All of those present at the time the
testator made her mark testified that she held the pen and placed the
mark herself. The testator died almost one year after she made her will.
The appellant contended that the testator failed to execute the will with
the requisite formalities under Probate Code section 5915 since the testa-
tor merely made her mark without signing or printing her name. The
appellant requested an instructed verdict that the testator did not execute
the will with the requisite formalities, which the trial court denied. The
appeals court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion
for instructed verdict since the testator's mark met the requisite formali-
ties for execution. 16 The appeals court found that sufficient evidence ex-
isted to support the jury's finding that the testator made the mark
7. Id. at 884. The appeals court found that the trial court committed no error by
overruling the appellant's motion for JNOV. Id.
8. Id. The court thus found that the trial court committed no error by overruling
appellant's motion for new trial. Id. at 884-85.
9. Id. at 886. The court noted that the jury considered evidence that the testator lost
contact with most of her friends after she moved into the nursing home, the testator suf-
fered from depression following her husband's death and the decline in her own health,
and the testator became dependent on the appellant and one other person for assistance
with her financial affairs. Id.
10. Id. at 887. The appellant contended that the university contested the 1987 will by
paying a contingent fee to the attorney representing the will contestant. The court found
moot the appellant's contention because the trial court found the later will, which con-
tained a no contest clause, invalid, so that whether the university actually contested the will
did not matter. Id.
11. 917 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
12. TEX. PROE. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
13. Orozco, 917 S.W.2d at 73.
14. Id. at 74.
15. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon Supp. 1996). Section 59 requires that a will
either be wholly in the testator's handwriting, or be signed by the testator in the presence
of two or more subscribing witnesses. Id.
16. Orozco, 917 S.W.2d at 73.
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herself. 17 The court further found that the jury's finding that a person
whom the testator identified in her will as her son was not her son was
not inconsistent with the jury's finding that the testator had testamentary
capacity. a8
In Estate of Davis19 the court examined the evidence considered by the
jury and found that no legally or factually sufficient evidence supported
the jury's finding that the testator executed her will as the result of undue
influence.20 Prior to her husband's death, the testator and her husband
executed wills in which they equally benefitted their six children on the
death of the survivor. During her husband's last illness, conflicts devel-
oped between the testator and two of her sons concerning her husband's
medical treatment, and the conflicts continued following his death con-
cerning funeral and burial decisions. The two sons had no contact with
the testator after the funeral. Several months after her husband died, the
testator executed a new will, in which she changed the executor from one
of the sons with whom she had a conflict, gave each of the two sons with
which she had a conflict a small gift, and left the remainder of her estate
equally to her other four children. At the time the testator executed her
new will she lived with two of her daughters, who had several conversa-
tions with the testator about the conduct of the two sons. Following the
testator's death, the two sons contested the probate of the second will and
the jury found that the testator executed the new will as the result of
undue influence. The other four children requested a new trial, which the
trial court denied, on the basis that no evidence existed to support the
jury's finding. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and the
four children appealed. The appeals court considered the three elements
of undue influence set forth in Rothermel v. Duncan2l and found that no
17. Id. at 74. The court noted that everyone present at the execution of the will testi-
fied that the testator made her mark. The testimony of those present when the testator
signed her will, the court reasoned, could rationally carry more weight than the testator's
doctor, who was not present, and a nurse who reviewed the medical file, who was also not
present. Id.
18. Id. at 75. The testator apparently identified a man as her son to several witnesses,
as well as identifying him as her son in her will. The jury, however, found that the man was
not her son, although some facts supported the testator's belief. The jury also found that
the testator did not lack testamentary capacity because of her identification of the man as
her son. The appellant did not request a jury instruction on insane delusion, but later
requested the trial court to consider the jury's response as if they had received an instruc-
tion on insane delusion. The appeals court noted that the jury considered the issue of
whether the man was the testator's son and the court could not decide that the jury failed
to consider the testator's belief in their finding that the testator had testamentary capacity.
Id. The court thus held that the jury's answer that the man was not the testator's son was
not inconsistent with its other answers. Id.
19. 920 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
20. Id. at 467.
21. 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963). The three elements, which the contestant must
prove, are as follows:
1. the existence and exertion of an influence;
2. the effective operation of such influence so as to subvert or overpower
the mind of the testator at the time of the execution of the testament; and
3. the execution of a testament which the maker thereof would not have
executed but for such influence.
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evidence existed that the children who lived with the testator exerted un-
due influence in connection with the new will,22 that no evidence existed
that the testator executed the will not as the result of her own free will,
but as the result of an overpowering influence, 23 and that no evidence
existed that the testator would not have executed the will except for the
alleged influence.24
In Evans v. May25 the court determined that the decedent did not re-
voke a will that he had taped together and on which he had written a note
indicating that he had not torn the will and that the will was still in ef-
fect.26 The court also found that no undue influence existed as a matter
of law based on the testator's relationship with his "lifemate." 27 The tes-
tator executed his will, in which he named his long-time companion as
executor and sole beneficiary, with all requisite formalities of law. A few
days after the testator executed the will he and his companion argued,
and the companion tore up the will. The testator taped the will back
together and noted on each page that he had not torn the will and that
the will was still in effect. The testator also signed the note on each page.
Following the testator's death, his sister contested the probate of the will
on the bases that the testator had revoked the will because it was torn
and undue influence. The trial court admitted the will to probate, and the
sister appealed. The appeals court found that not only was the will not in
a state of mutilation because it had been taped back together, but also
that the testator's handwritten note supported the trial court's determina-
tion that the testator had not revoked the will.28 The sister also con-
tended that the fact that the testator had lived with his companion for
over thirty years and the nature of their relationship established undue
influence. The sister provided no other evidence of undue influence, nor
did she object to the testimony of the attorney who drafted the will, who
stated that the testator did not act under undue influence when he exe-
cuted the will. The appeals court held that because the sister did not
object to the testimony, and because she failed to establish any of the
elements of undue influence, no undue influence existed.29
B. WILL CONSTRUCrION
In Estate of Hunt3o the court determined that the testator died intestate
in so far as the remainder interest in a testamentary trust, so that the
remainder of the trust would pass to the testator's heirs at the death of
Id. at 922.
22. Davis, 920 S.W.2d at 466.
23. Id. at 467.
24. Id, The court reversed the cause for a new trial because the appellants did not lay
the predicate for rendition of judgment. Id. at 467-68.
25. 923 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
26. Id. at 714.
27. Id. at 715.
28. Id. at 714.
29. Id. at 715.
30. 908 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
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the lifetime beneficiary. 31 The testator established a testamentary trust
for the benefit of a niece for the niece's lifetime. The testator provided
for a contingent beneficiary if the niece failed to survive the testator, but
the testator made no provision for distribution of the trust following the
niece's death if the niece survived the testator. The trustee filed a declar-
atory judgment action, requesting the court to determine the disposition
of the remainder of the trust estate upon the death of the niece. The
testator's statutory heirs, other than the niece, who took no part in the
action, filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the testator
died intestate as to the remainder interest in the trust. The contingent
beneficiary, which was a charity, also filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on the basis that it should receive the remainder interest. The trial
court granted the charity's motion for summary judgment. The appeals
court found that the will was not ambiguous, therefore, the trial court
should not have applied any rules of will construction. 32 The court found
that since the testator made no provision for disposition of the remainder
interest within the will, the remainder interest passed by intestacy.33 The
court also found that the trial court should have determined the testator's
heirs, and, since an ad litem represented the interests of the unknown and
unascertained heirs and the heirs filed affidavits establishing their kinship
with the testator, the heirs met the burden of proving their heirship as a
matter of law.34 The appeals court reversed the trial court and rendered
judgment declaring the heirship of the six heirs and the amount of the
remainder interest each would receive upon the death of the testator's
niece. 35
In In re Estate of Brown36 the court considered whether ademption
resulted when, at the time of his death, the testator did not own certain
property he devised and bequeathed in his will.37 The testator specified
in his will that he left his residence located at a specific address to his
wife. The testator also left his wife the proceeds of a life insurance policy
for the purpose of purchasing his interest in his professional association
and in the partnership owning the medical clinic building in which his
practice was located. After he made the will the testator and his wife
moved to a new residence. The testator attempted to make another will
prior to his death, but the trial court found that the testator did not exe-
cute the later will with the requisite formalities and denied the probate.
The testator's brother then offered the earlier will for probate, the trial
court admitted the earlier will to probate, and then the brother, as execu-
tor, filed a petition for construction of the will. The testator's two daugh-
ters from an earlier marriage claimed that ademption prevented the gifts
31. Id. at 486.
32. Id. at 485.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 486.
35. Id.
36. 922 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
37. Id. at 606-09.
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of both the residence and the insurance policy since the testator did not
own the residence listed in his will at the time of his death and no one
could locate any record showing the ownership of the insurance policy
listed. The trial court first found that the professional association owned
key-man insurance to fund the purchase of a decedent shareholder's in-
terest in the association and in the medical clinic partnership at all times
between the date the testator executed the earlier will and the date of the
testator's death. The trial court then concluded that the testator intended
for his wife to receive his interest in the residence in which they lived at
the time of his death, as well as the proceeds from the sale of his profes-
sional association stock and partnership interest in the medical clinic
property. The appeals court noted first that ademption will apply only to
a specific devise or bequest. 38 The appeals court found that although the
trial court did not classify the devise of the residence as a specific devise,
the trial court did find that the devise would have failed if the testator
had not owned a residence at the time of his death.39 The appeals court
found that the devise of the residence was specific and that it failed be-
cause the testator did not own the listed residence at the time of his
death.40 The appeals court next considered the gift of the insurance pol-
icy and determined that the gift was ambiguous, so that the trial court
properly considered extrinsic evidence to determine the testator's in-
tent.41 The court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the resi-
dence and affirmed the trial court's decision concerning the gift of the
insurance policy.42
C. PRIVITY
In Barcelo v. Elliott43 the court held that an attorney owes no duty of
care to intended beneficiaries of a will or trust when the testator or settlor
retained the attorney.44 The decedent engaged the services of an estate
planning attorney in 1990. The decedent executed an inter vivos trust, in
which she appointed a bank as trustee, and a new will, which left the
residue of her estate to the inter vivos trust upon her death. The decedent
was the sole beneficiary of the trust during her lifetime, with the remain-
der passing to her children, siblings, and grandchildren. The trust agree-
ment specifically stated that it would be effective only when executed by
38. Id. at 607, (citing Welch v. Straach, 518 S.W.2d 862, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco),
rev'd on other grounds, 531 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1975)).
39. Id. at 607-08. The appeals court reasoned that the trial court implicitly found that
the devise of the residence was specific. Id.
40. Id. at 608.
41. Id. at 608-09. The court determined that the gift of the insurance policy created a
latent ambiguity, which the trial court could only resolve through consideration of extrinsic
evidence. Id. at 609.
42. Id. at 609. The dissent disagreed with the majority concerning the ademption of
the residence and would have held that the wife should receive the gift of the residence in
which they resided at the time of the testator's death. Id. at 609-10 (Cornelius, C.J.,
dissenting).
43. 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
44. Id. at 579.
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the bank. The bank failed to execute the trust agreement during the de-
cedent's lifetime. Following the decedent's death, two of her children
contended that the trust was invalid. The probate court agreed with the
two children and found that the decedent's estate passed by intestacy.
The grandchildren settled with the estate for less than they contended
that they would have received had the trust been valid. The grandchil-
dren then sued the drafting attorney for malpractice, alleging that the
attorney negligently drafted the trust and the will, negligently failed to
ensure the full execution of the trust, and negligently failed to ensure
funding of the trust. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that he owed no duty to the grandchildren as intended benefi-
ciaries of the trust. The trial court granted the attorney's motion for sum-
mary judgment and the appeals court affirmed. 45 The supreme court also
affirmed.4 6 The supreme court held that the intended beneficiaries could
not recover under a third-party beneficiary theory.47 Two dissenting jus-
tices would have held that an intended beneficiary of a will or testamen-
tary trust who lost a legacy due to negligence on the part of the drafting
attorney could bring a cause of action against a drafting attorney.48 A
third dissenting justice, in a separate dissent, would have limited any
cause of action by intended beneficiaries to only those specifically identi-
fied in the invalid instrument. 49
II. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
In Cummings v. Cummings50 the court found that the trial court im-
properly granted a motion for summary judgment when a fact issue ex-
isted concerning whether a bank account was an individual account or an
account payable to a third party on the death of the owner.51 The dece-
45. Barcelo v. Elliot, 927 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), affd,
923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
46. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 579. The majority noted the conflicts that could arise be-
tween disappointed intended beneficiaries and the drafting attorney. Id. at 578. The court
stated as follows:
[W]e are unable to craft a bright-line rule that allows a lawsuit to proceed
where alleged malpractice causes a will or trust to fail in a manner that casts
no real doubt on the testator's intentions, while prohibiting actions in other
situations. We believe the greater good is served by preserving a bright-line
privity rule which denies a cause of action to all beneficiaries whom the at-
torney did not represent. This will ensure that attorneys may in all cases
zealously represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties
compromising that representation.
Id. at 578-79.
The supreme court denied writ in another case involving the same issues. Oliver v. West,
908 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1995, writ denied). In Oliver v. West, the appeals
court held that the drafting attorney owed no duty to intended beneficiaries who were not
the attorney's clients. Id. at 631. The appeals court also held that the intended benefi-
ciaries could not allege a cause of action under a third-party beneficiary theory. Id.
47. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 579.
48. Id. at 579-81 (Cornyn, J., joined by Abbott, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 581-82 (Spector, J., dissenting).
50. 923 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
51. Id. at 134-35.
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dent opened a bank account in 1986. The signature card contained an
"X" in the block indicating an individual account. Another block, which
would have indicated that the account was a "POD" account, contained
no "X." The name of one of the decedent's children, however, appeared
in a box indicating a beneficiary designation for a trust or "POD" ac-
count. The trial court granted a summary judgment, finding that the de-
cedent created an individual account, which was part of his probate
estate, rather than a "POD" account. The child listed as the beneficiary
on the signature card appealed. The appeals court found that the signa-
ture card was ambiguous and that the decedent's intent in establishing the
type of account created a factual issue precluding summary judgment.52
In Cweren v. Danziger 3 the court held that the trial court incorrectly
granted summary judgment on the issue that certain joint accounts did
not have survivorship rights or were trust accounts when the movant only
offered evidence that the banks did not have signature cards or other
documents on file that indicated the decedent's intent in creating the ac-
counts.54 The decedent created twenty bank accounts at three different
banks, in which she styled the account in her name and in the name of
one or more family members. Following the decedent's death, the admin-
istrator of her estate sought to include the accounts in the decedent's pro-
bate estate and filed a declaratory judgment action concerning the
accounts. The administrator alleged that none of the banks had any doc-
uments on file indicating the decedent's intention to create either joint
tenancy accounts with rights of survivorship or trust accounts. The ad-
ministrator offered no other evidence, but relied upon Stauffer v. Hender-
son55 and section 439 of the Probate Code56 in his contention that the
styles of the accounts did not establish any survivorship rights. The ap-
peals court found section 43957 does not require the use of written agree-
ments to create joint accounts with rights of survivorship and that
Probate Code section 436(14)58 does not require that a trust designation
on an account be on file with the bank that holds the account.59 The
court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case.60
In Emmens v. Johnson6' the court held that the decedent's divorce pre-
cluded his ex-spouse from receiving the benefits under his profit-sharing
52. Id. at 134.
53. 923 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
54. Id. at 644-45.
55. 801 S.W.2d 858, 865 (Tex. 1990).
56. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439 (Vernon Supp. 1996) provides the methods of creat-
ing a joint account with rights of survivorship and a trust account.
57. Id.
58. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 436(14) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
59. Cweren, 923 S.W.2d at 644. The court found that the administrator did not offer
any evidence that no one else held the written agreements creating the type of accounts or
that he had made any inquiries or personal search concerning the location of any written
agreements. Id. The court found that the administrator thus did not meet his burden of
proof to establish that he was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 644-45.
60. Id. at 645.
61. 923 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
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plan.62 Following his divorce, the decedent failed to change the benefici-
ary designation on his profit-sharing plan from his ex-wife. The value of
the decedent's plan grew significantly between the time of his divorce and
the date of his death. The administrator of the decedent's estate notified
the decedent's employer that section 3.633 of the Family Code 63 provided
that the divorce terminated the beneficiary designation in favor of the ex-
wife and that the administrator should receive the decedent's plan bene-
fits. The employer received the administrator's notice prior to paying
benefits. The administrator later sued the employer to collect the bene-
fits. The trial court originally found that the employer should pay the
benefits to the administrator, but, on rehearing, found that the ex-wife
was the beneficiary. The administrator appealed, alleging that the ex-
wife could not remain the beneficiary unless the decedent redesignated
her as beneficiary following the divorce. The appeals court held that
Family Code section 3.633,64 which provides that the ex-wife's designa-
tion as beneficiary terminated upon divorce, is the federal common law
that controls the matter and reversed the trial court's judgment. 65
III. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
In Lacy v. Lacy 66 the court affirmed a judgment denying heirship.67
The decedent died intestate in 1949, but no one undertook an action for
determination of heirship until 1988. Two of the applicants for the deter-
mination of heirship contended that they were born prior to the dece-
dent's first marriage, while the decedent lived with their mother as
husband and wife. Testimony given at trial by numerous witnesses, how-
ever, provided evidence that the two applicants were the biological chil-
dren of another person with the same last name. The court entered a
judgment denying the heirship of the two applicants in 1993. The court
specifically found that the two applicants were not the decedent's chil-
dren and concluded that the two applicants failed to meet their burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence that they were the decedent's
children. In 1994, after the appeals court had originally denied the appeal
of the judgment denying heirship on the basis that no final judgment of
heirship existed,68 the trial court entered a judgment declaring heirship,
in which the court found that the only children born to the decedent were
born during his first marriage. The two applicants did not request the
court to make any additional findings of fact or conclusions of law con-
cerning the heirship, and the court did not do so. The two persons who
alleged that they were the decedent's biological children appealed. The
appeals court found that sufficient evidence existed to support the judg-
62. Id. at 712.
63. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.633 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
64. Id.
65. Emmens, 923 S.W.2d at 712.
66. 922 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995, writ denied).
67. Id. at 198.
68. Id. at 197.
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ment denying heirship. 69
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
In Dickey v. Dickey70 the court held that the probate court had jurisdic-
tion over an ex-wife's claim against her ex-husband's estate for the
amount of life insurance proceeds the divorce court ordered the ex-hus-
band to maintain.71 The decedent and his ex-wife divorced in 1967. Pur-
suant to the terms of the divorce decree the decedent was to maintain two
life insurance policies on his life, which named his ex-wife as primary ben-
eficiary and his children as contingent beneficiaries. The decedent also
had the duty to inform his ex-wife if he allowed the policies to lapse. The
decedent allowed one policy to lapse in 1972 and the other in 1973. Fol-
lowing the decedent's death his ex-wife filed suit in probate court for
damages in the amount of the lapsed policies. The ex-wife filed a motion
for partial summary judgment accompanied by her affidavit stating that
her ex-husband never informed her that the policies had lapsed. The ex-
husband's executor alleged that laches and the statute of limitations
barred the ex-wife's claim. The probate court entered partial summary
judgment for the ex-wife. The executor appealed, alleging that the pro-
bate court should have considered her defense of either the four year
statute of limitations, the ten year statute of limitations, or laches. The
executor also contended that the probate court did not have jurisdiction
over a non-probate asset. The appeals court found that the discovery
rule72 applied to the case, that a fact issue existed concerning when the
ex-wife learned of the lapse of the policies, and that the probate court
improperly granted summary judgment because of the fact issue.73 The
court then found that the executor did not present any evidence in sup-
port of her defense of laches.74 Finally, the court found that the probate
court had jurisdiction to hear the ex-wife's claim against the estate.75
69. Id. at 198. The court held that the trial court properly excluded two documents as
hearsay because the appellants offered the documents to establish the truth of the matter
asserted. Id. The appeals court also affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the appel-
lants' claim for title and possession of real property because the trial court lacked jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 199. The appeals court found that the trial court, which was a statutory county
court, only had jurisdiction to hear the determination of heirship, but did not have jurisdic-
tion to hear the disputed real property matters since no estate administration was pending.
Id. Finally, the appeals court held, after reviewing the judgment declaring heirship, that
the judgment met the requirements of TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 54 (Vernon 1980). Lacy,
922 S.W.2d at 200.
70. 908 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
71. Id. at 314.
72. See Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990). The discovery
rule "operates to toll the running of the period of limitations until the time that the plaintiff
discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should discover, the
nature of his injury." Id.
73. Dickey, 908 S.W. at 313. The court also found that the executor did not prove all
elements of the affirmative defense of limitations, so the trial court could not dismiss the
action on that basis.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 314.
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In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Olson76 the court held that the
testator's homestead was exempt from the claims of his creditors because
his minor child survived him.77 The decedent was survived by an adult
son, who was named executor of his estate, and a minor daughter. The
decedent's will provided for distribution of his estate, including the home-
stead, to his son. The daughter lived with her mother elsewhere, but the
decedent contributed to her support during his lifetime. The estate was
insolvent, and its largest creditor filed a claim in which it sought a judg-
ment lien against all of the decedent's non-exempt real property. The
creditor claimed that the homestead was not exempt, but the executor
claimed that the homestead was exempt because of the existence of the
minor child. The probate court agreed with the executor, granted sum-
mary judgment in his favor, and awarded him attorney's fees. The credi-
tor appealed, asserting that the homestead lost its exempt status when
neither the minor child nor her guardian asserted any right to occupy the
property and that the trial court erred by awarding the executor attor-
ney's fees. The appeals court found that the minor child's right to occupy
the homestead property is distinct from the beneficiary's right to receive
the property clear of the decedent's debts,78 and that the homestead re-
mained exempt because of the existence of the minor child. 79 The court
also found that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney's fees to the executor because only this creditor attempted to
exert a claim against the homestead property.80
In Shepherd v. Ledford8' the court held that the decedent's surviving
spouse, his only heir, could assert claims for personal injury on behalf of
his estate without an administration of the estate. 82 The decedent died
following surgery for replacement of an aortic valve. The decedent's sole
survivor was his common-law wife. The wife made arrangements for pay-
ment of the decedent's debts, thus making an administration of his estate
unnecessary. The decedent owned no real property and little personal
property, all of which was community property and all of which passed to
his wife at his death. The decedent's wife filed suit against the doctors as
the surviving spouse and as the decedent's heir. The trial court awarded
the wife damages as the surviving spouse, but disregarded the jury's ver-
dict awarding damages for the decedent's personal suffering, on the basis
that no personal representative of the estate brought the action. The ap-
76. 920 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
77. Id. at 462.
78. Id. at 461. The court noted that the existence of a surviving minor child is suffi-
cient for determining exempt status of the homestead. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art XVI,§ 52; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 279 (Vernon 1980); Milner v. McDaniel, 120 Tex. 160, 164,
36 S.W.2d 992, 993 (1931); Childers v. Henderson, 76 Tex. 664, 665, 13 S.W. 481, 482-83(1890)).
79. Olson, 920 S.W.2d at 462. The court found that the facts upon the death of the
decedent determine the exempt nature of the property and that later events have no effect.
Id. Thus, once the homestead was exempt, it remained exempt. Id.
80. Id. at 463.
81. 926 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ granted).
82. Id. at 414.
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peals court found that the surviving wife was a "legal representative" of
the decedent and that no administration of the estate was necessary in




In Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Elli-
son84 the court held that the trial court reasonably determined that the
guardian had performed his duties and thus did not abuse its discretion
when it did not remove the guardian.85 The ward was a long-time resi-
dent of a state school. The guardian, appointed in 1978, oversaw the
ward's rural real estate. Under court approval, the guardian had leased
the real property for many years and had included the rental income in
the annual accounts furnished to the court. The Texas Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) obtained two
agreed judgments for the amount of the ward's care. After TDMHMR
obtained the first agreed judgment, it requested that the trial court order
the sale of the ward's real estate to satisfy the judgment, which the court
ordered in 1987. The guardian did not sell the property after that date.
Approximately one year after the second agreed judgment TDMHMR
applied for the removal of the guardian because the guardian had not
sold the property. The court determined not to remove the guardian.
The guardian later filed a motion requesting the court to set aside 200
acres of the property as the ward's homestead. TDMHMR responded by
again filing an application for removal of the guardian. The trial court
granted the guardian's motion for recognition of the homestead, but lim-
ited the homestead to 100 acres, and denied TDMHMR's application for
removal of the guardian. The trial court also allowed the guardian attor-
ney's fees from the guardianship estate. TDMHMR appealed, alleging
that the guardian breached his duty to the ward by failing to act on
TDMHMR's claims in a timely manner, by failing to sell the property, by
mismanaging the estate, and by other acts. The appeals court found that
the trial court properly exercised its discretion not to remove the guard-
ian under Probate Code section 797,86 Probate Code section 761(c)(3), 87
83. Id.
84. 914 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
85. Id. at 683.
86. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 797 (Vernon Supp. 1996) provides that a court may re-
move a guardian for failure to act on a claim if the claimant later successfully brings suit to
establish the claim. The language is permissive, rather than mandatory, thus allowing the
trial court discretion in making its determination.
87. Id. § 761(c)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1996) provides that a court has discretion to remove
a guardian if the guardian failed to obey a court order concerning the performance of the
guardian's duties. The guardian testified that he had listed the property with two different
brokers and that he had advertised the property in the newspaper, but that no one had
bought the property. The trial court found that the guardian had acted to follow the court
order. Ellison, 914 S.W.2d at 680.
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or Probate Code section 761(c)(7) 88 when it found that the guardian had
acted reasonably and prudently. 89 The appeals court upheld the trial
court's award of attorney's fees to the guardian. 90 Finally, the appeals
court upheld the homestead designation on 100 acres of the ward's
property.91
In Adcock v. Sherling92 the court held that the trial court improperly
failed to appoint the ward's son as guardian when the trial court had no
evidence before it that the son was not eligible to serve as guardian.93
The ward gave two of her sons a certificate of deposit several years before
the commencement of the guardianship proceedings. The sons kept the
certificate of deposit, but used it for the benefit of their mother. At the
hearing on the application for appointment of guardian, one of the sons
testified concerning the existence of the certificate of deposit, the agree-
ment that he and his brother had with his mother concerning the use of
the funds, and the actual use of the funds. The son also testified that he
owed his mother no money, that he was not a party to a lawsuit that
affected his mother, and that he had no claim adverse to her. The trial
court found that the son, by holding the certificate of deposit, in effect
asserted a claim against his mother's estate and could not serve as guard-
ian because of the perceived conflict of interest with his mother's estate.
The trial court appointed the son's niece as guardian of her grand-
mother's estate. The appeals court held that the evidence did not show
that the son asserted a claim against the estate or that any conflict of
interest existed. 94 The court then determined that under Probate Code
section 677(a)(2) 95 the trial court should have appointed the son rather
than the granddaughter as guardian. 96 The court next determined that
88. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 761(c)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1996) provides that the court
has discretion to remove a guardian if the guardian "interferes with the ward's progress or
participation in the community." Id. The trial court found that the guardian did not inter-
fere with the ward's progress, although the guardian attended annual meetings concerning
the ward and expressed his opinions at those meetings.
89. Ellison, 914 S.W.2d at 683.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 684-85. The court found that the guardian had established the intent to cre-
ate a homestead for the ward when the guardian placed a mobile home on the acreage to
provide a residence for the ward if the ward had to leave the state school for any reason.
Id. at 684. The court further stated its belief that the guardian would have breached his
duty if he had failed to establish the homestead. Id.
92. 923 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
93. Id. at 79.
94. Id. at 77. The court stated as follows: "Surely, if a parent gives a child a portion of
the parent's property, trusting that the child will use the property to care for the parent's
benefit, and the child holds the money for that purpose, the child is not thereby rendered
ineligible to serve as the parent's guardian." Id. at 76.
95. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 677(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996) provides that, when two
or more eligible persons qualify for appointment as guardian, the ward's next of kin shall
serve as guardian if the ward's spouse is not eligible to serve. Id.
96. Adcock, 923 S.W.2d at 77. The court found that TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 677
required the court to appoint the ward's son as her guardian, since he was the next of kin
and he was eligible to serve when the ward's spouse was not eligible or willing to serve, and
that the court could not appoint the granddaughter since she was not related to the ward in
the same degree as the ward's son. Id. at 78.
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the funds held in the certificate of deposit were a part of the ward's estate
since the son held the funds for the ward's benefit.97 The court reformed
the judgment to appoint the son as the guardian and to authorize the
issuance of letters to the son, affirmed the trial court's determination on
the ownership of the certificate of deposit and the payment of the attor-
ney ad litem's fees, and reversed the part of the judgment that awarded
attorney's fees to the niece and the payment of those fees from the certifi-
cate of deposit.98
B. ATrORNEY AND GUARDIAN'S FEES
In Simmons v. Harris County99 the court held that an attorney not ap-
pointed by the trial court to represent a proposed ward could not recover
attorney's fees from the county. 100 The ward's estate did not have suffi-
cient assets to pay the guardian's attorney for his services. The attorney,
whom the guardian employed, made an application for payment of attor-
ney's fees by the county. The trial court denied the application and the
attorney appealed. The court considered Probate Code section 247101
and determined that it did not allow payment of attorney's fees as costs in
an insolvent guardianship. 102 The court next considered whether any
other statute provided authority for allowing the attorney's fees as costs,
and determined that no such authority existed. 103 The court thus deter-
mined that the attorney could not recover his fees from the county as
costs in the case.1°4
In Henderson v. Viesca 105 the court held that a person may be compen-
97. Id. at 79. The court also held that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the
ward's other son since he filed a waiver and renunciation of his right to be appointed
guardian prior to the guardianship hearing. Id. The waiver constituted an appearance,
giving the trial court jurisdiction over the other son and the ability to adjudicate the two
sons' rights in the certificate of deposit. Id. The court found that the ownership of the
funds held in the certificate of deposit were at issue in the case by the application for
appointment of guardian, even thought the certificate of deposit was not specifically men-
tioned in the pleadings. Id.
98. Id. at 80.
99. 917 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
100. Id. at 378.
101. TEX. PROB. CODE AtN. § 247 (Vernon 1980), which has now been replaced by
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 669 (Vernon Supp. 1996), provided that the county shall pay for
the cost of the proceeding if the estate has insufficient assets to pay for the costs. TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 669 (Vernon Supp. 1996) was in effect at the time the trial court made
its determination that the county was not responsible for the attorney's fees. TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 669 (Vernon Supp. 1996) reads essentially the same as TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 247 (Vernon 1980) did.
102. Simmons, 917 S.W.2d at 377.
103. Id. at 377-78. The court found that TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 688 (Vernon Supp.
1996) specifically allows as costs the fees of attorneys appointed under TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 646 (Vernon Supp. 1996), which provides for the appointment of an attorney ad
litem. Simmons, 917 S.W.2d at 378. The attorney requesting the fees in this case was not
the attorney ad litem, but was instead the guardian's attorney, engaged by the guardian,
not appointed by the court.
104. Id.
105. 922 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
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sated for services both as a guardian and as attorney for the estate.' 0 6
The ward first had a guardian of her estate appointed in 1981 and a
guardian for her person appointed in 1982. In 1988, following litigation,
the court appointed the appellee guardian of the estate. The appellee
only consented to serve if she could serve as both guardian and attorney
for the estate. No one objected, and the court specifically stated, in its
order appointing the guardian, that she could serve as attorney for the
estate at her usual rate if she obtained the court's approval of her fee.
The court also specifically provided that the guardian could receive the
statutory guardian's commission. The guardian later sought court ap-
proval for the engagement of another attorney for the estate for a spe-
cific, limited purpose of representing the estate in litigation involving the
construction of a testamentary trust and breach of fiduciary duty by the
trustee of the trust. The court approved the engagement, and the second
attorney secured a significant trust distribution for the ward, as well as a
settlement on the breach of fiduciary duty issue. During the litigation,
however, one of the ward's daughters filed a motion requesting the court
to remove the guardian and to disallow payment of any attorney's fees to
the guardian. The court determined that the daughter lacked standing to
request the disallowance of attorney's fees since she and the guardian
were adverse parties in the trust litigation. The guardian resigned after
the settlement of the trust litigation, which rendered moot the daughter's
application for removal. The guardian filed a final accounting, along with
applications for her guardianship fee, for additional compensation, and
for attorney's fees and expenses. The ward's attorney ad litem objected
to the final account and filed an amended bill of review objecting to the
court's approval of the guardian's earlier annual accounts and applica-
tions for attorney and guardian's fees. The court denied the amended bill
of review, approved most of the annual account, and authorized payment
of the guardian's fee, the additional compensation, and the attorney's
fees. The appeals court found no case law that directly authorized the
payment of both the guardian's commission and attorney's fees to the
same individual, 10 7 but stated that public policy favors double compensa-
tion to avoid duplication of effort and costs.' 0 8 The court held that the
trial court properly awarded both attorney's fees and guardian's compen-
sation to the guardian1o9 The court also affirmed the trial court's award
of guardianship commissions on the increased distributions from the trust
106. Id. at 558.
107. Id. at 557-58. The court, however, found two cases that authorized payment to an
individual for services as attorney and executor. Id. (citing Burton v. Bean, 549 S.W.2d 48,
51-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1977, no writ), and Neblett v. Butler, 162 S.W.2d 458, 461-
62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, writ refd w.o.m.)).
108. Henderson, 922 S.W.2d at 558. The court stated that the probate court would con-
sider each application more carefully to ensure that no duplication of payment would oc-




that resulted from the litigation. 110 The court upheld the trial court's or-
der reimbursing the guardian for attorney's fees she incurred in defend-
ing the removal action,"' but also held that the guardian should be
reimbursed for fees she incurred in defending the final account." 2
In Dalworth Trucking Co. v. Bulen 1 3 the court held that the fee
awarded to an attorney ad litem appointed to represent the interests of a
minor child was excessive and reduced the fee." 4 The underlying wrong-
ful death litigation concerned the death of the child's father in a truck
accident. The court appointed an attorney ad litem to represent the inter-
ests of the decedent's minor child in the litigation. The ad litem involved
himself in the litigation, taking an active role in depositions, mediation,
and the trial. The ad litem also helped establish a guardianship for the
child. The ad litem testified that, due to the complex issues and amount
of time involved in representing the interests of the child, he lost other
business. The trial court awarded the ad litem $100,000 for his efforts.
The appeals court found that the ad litem could only account for time
that would result in a fee of about $30,000, and accordingly reduced the
judgment for the ad litem's fee to $40,000.115
VI. TRUSTS
A. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
In Huie v. DeShazo 1 6 the court held that an attorney representing a
trustee in his fiduciary capacity represents only the trustee, not any bene-
ficiary of the trust.117 The relator served as executor of his wife's will and
trustee of three testamentary trusts that she established for the benefit of
her three daughters. A conflict arose between the relator and one of the
daughters, who sued her father for breach of fiduciary duty. The daugh-
ter took the deposition of the attorney who had represented her father in
his fiduciary capacities since her mother's death. Until the time of the
lawsuit, the attorney had received his compensation from estate and trust
funds. At the deposition the attorney claimed the attorney-client and at-
torney-work-product privileges and declined to answer any questions that
110. Id. at 560. The court found that the evidence of the accountings supported the trial
court's determination that the trust distributions were income, not principal, so the guard-
ian could receive compensation based upon the distributions. Id.
111. Id. at 561.
112. Id. at 562. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of
the amount of reimbursement the guardian should receive for defending the final account.
Id. at 566.
113. 924 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
114. Id. at 739.
115. Id. The ad litem apparently urged that part of his fee was a contingent fee, but the
court found that he could recover a contingent fee only if the order appointing him as ad
litem specifically provided that his fees were contingent upon success for the child. Id. at
738. The court stated that if the ad litem received any fees for assisting the plaintiffs, he
should receive compensation from the contingent fees of the plaintiffs' attorneys, not from
the defendants. Id. at 738-39.
116. 922 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. 1996).
117. Id. at 921.
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concerned the business of the trust. The daughter attempted to compel
the attorney's responses, but the attorney requested a protective order.
The trial court ordered the attorney to respond to any questions concern-
ing matters that occurred before the date of the lawsuit, finding that the
attorney-client privilege did not apply to communications between the
trustee and the attorney relating to those matters.118 The trial court also
found that the trustee and attorney could not claim the attorney-work-
product privilege for matters occurring prior to the time the daughter
filed suit. The trustee moved for leave to file writ of mandamus, which
the appeals court initially granted, then vacated, stating that it granted
the order improvidently. The trustee then sought relief from the supreme
court. The daughter argued that because the trustee owed the beneficiary
the duty of full disclosure, he could not hide behind the attorney-client
privilege concerning fiduciary matters. The court agreed that the trustee
owed the duty to disclose any material matters that affected the benefici-
ary's rights, but found that the communication between the trustee and
the attorney was subject to the attorney-client privilege. 119 The court
held that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between
the trustee and the attorney under Rule 503120 even though the trustee
has the duty to disclose material matters to the beneficiary. 121 The court
further discounted the beneficiary's argument that the attorney repre-
sented her and held that the attorney represented the trustee in his fiduci-
ary capacity, not the beneficiary.122 The court also found that the trustee
and the attorney could claim the attorney-work-product privilege for all
materials prepared after the time they anticipated litigation. 123
In Hallmark v. PortlCooper-T. Smith Stevedoring Co.124 the court de-
termined that the trustee owned certain stock certificates issued in the
name of the trust, rather than the trustee, since the trustee held legal title
to the stock certificates. 125 The appellant was an employee of a partner-
ship, one of the partners of which was a corporation in which she also
owned stock. The appellant and the partnership entered into an employ-
ment agreement, which provided for the appellant's employment by the
partnership for ten years. The employment agreement included a termi-
nation clause that provided that her employment could be terminated by
unanimous consent of all the partners of the partnership if the partner-
118. The trial court determined that the attorney-client privilege only extended to com-
munications between the trustee and the attorney after the lawsuit arose, when the trustee
sought advice from the attorney concerning his defense of the lawsuit and the trustee indi-
vidually paid for the advice rather than paying for the advise from trust funds. See id. at
922.
119. Id at 923-24. The court noted that a trustee might choose not to seek legal advice
if he thought that his communication with the attorney would not fall within the attorney-
client privilege, which might harm the beneficiaries. Id at 924.
120. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 503.
121. Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 925.
122. Id. at 925-26.
123. Id. at 927.
124. 907 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
125. Id. at 590.
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ship interests remained in the hands of the shareholders of the two corpo-
rations that formed the partnership, or the "respective heirs and personal
representatives, lineal descendants,.. . and any combination of the fore-
going"'126 of any of the shareholders. The employee transferred her stock
in the corporation to irrevocable trusts the year after she entered the em-
ployment agreement. The employee's daughter served as trustee of the
trusts, and the daughter and the employee's grandchildren were the bene-
ficiaries of the trusts. The corporation issued the stock certificates in the
name of the trusts rather than in the daughter's name, as trustee. A dis-
pute later arose between the employee, a shareholder in the corporation
that was the other partner to the partnership, and the remaining share-
holder in the corporation in which the employee had once held stock. As
a result of the dispute, the partnership terminated the employee's em-
ployment. The majority shareholder in the corporation in which the em-
ployee had previously owned stock then removed the employee as an
officer and director of the corporation. The employee brought suit for
wrongful termination. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the employee appealed. The employee argued on appeal
that the other parties to the employment agreement could not enforce the
termination provision because of the transfer of the employee's stock to
the trusts. The appeals court had to consider the terms of the employ-
ment agreement, as well as the trust agreements, to determine whether
the transfer made the termination provision of the employment agree-
ment inapplicable. The court found that the trustee held legal title to the
stock.127 The court then considered the issue of whether the daughter
and grandchildren, who held equitable title to the stock as beneficiaries
of the trust, were the employee's heirs and lineal descendants. 128 The
employee urged that her heirs and lineal descendants could not be deter-
mined until her death, but the court noted that the terms carry the conno-
tation of a living person's issue. 129 The court examined the entire
employment agreement to determine the meaning of the terms, found
that the employment agreement separately covers termination at the
death of the employee, and determined that the best method to give full
effect to the agreement was to find that the employee's daughter and
grandchildren were her lineal descendants for purposes of the agree-
ment. 130 The court thus found that the termination provisions of the em-
ployment agreement applied and that the termination of the employee
was valid. 13'
126. Id at 589.
127. Id. at 590.
128. Id. at 591-92.
129. Id. at 591 (citing Parrish v. Mills, 101 Tex. 276, 284, 106 S.W. 882, 886 (1908), and
Reilly v. Huff, 335 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ)).
130. Id. at 591-92.
131. Id. at 592. The court held that the surviving shareholder of the corporation did not
owe the employee a fiduciary duty under an "implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing" since the supreme court does not recognize that covenant. Id. (citing Federal Express
Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 285 n.1 (Tex. 1993), and English v. Fischer, 660
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In Cleaver v. George Staton Co. 132 the court held that the husband of a
beneficiary of a trust did not have standing to sue the trustee for causes of
action related to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty.133 The wife's father
created a testamentary trust for her benefit. The husband and wife mar-
ried several years after the death of the wife's father. During the mar-
riage the trustee made no distributions of income to the wife, although
the terms of the trust provided for mandatory income distributions. The
husband and wife separated and, while the divorce was pending, the hus-
band attempted to sue the trustee for breach of duty. Initially the hus-
band was the sole plaintiff in the trust action, but later he amended his
petition to include his wife as an "involuntary plaintiff." The trial court
dismissed the husband's suit for lack of standing. The appeals court first
found that any income distributions from the trust would be the wife's
separate property, 34 but that even if the distributions were community
property, that would have been the wife's sole management community
property. 35 The court found that the trial court never gained jurisdiction
over the wife since no service of process occurred, she never filed plead-
ings in connection with the trust action, and her attorney only appeared
at a hearing on the consolidation of the trust action with the divorce ac-
tion.' 36 The court also held that the fact that the husband attempted to
join the wife as an "involuntary plaintiff" did not give him standing to
pursue the trust action. 137
In Colvin v. Alta Mesa Resources, Inc.138 the court held that the owner/
beneficiary of an individual retirement account (IRA) could assign assets
of the IRA without authorization of the trustee of the account.' 39 The
owner of the IRA acquired a 1% interest in a mineral lease, which he
held individually, then later acquired an additional 2% interest, which he
held in his IRA. A bank served as custodian of the IRA. The owner of
the IRA later assigned all of the interests to a third party, which then
transferred those interests to another third party. The bank custodian
S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983)). Finally, the court held that the surviving shareholder did not
owe the employee any fiduciary duty based upon their friendship. Id.
132. 908 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-T'ler 1995, writ denied).
133. Id. at 471.
134. Id. at 470 (citing In re Marriage of Long, 542 S.W.2d 712, 717-18 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1976, no writ)).
135. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.22(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 471. The court found that only the wife had standing to pursue a cause of
action concerning the trustee's failure to make income distributions since the distributions,
if made, would have been the wife's separate property. Id. at 470-71. The court also found
that even if any trust distributions would have been community property, only the wife
would have had standing during the marriage to pursue the cause of action since the distri-
butions would have been her sole management community property. Id. at 471. Further,
the court noted that the husband did not allege that his wife attempted to defraud the
community estate by failing to pursue any claims against the trustee for failure to distribute
the funds. Id. The court found that the husband could not wrest the wife's management of
her special community merely by naming her as an "involuntary plaintiff." Id.
138. 920 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
139. Id. at 691.
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was not a party to the assignment from the IRA. The document evidenc-
ing the assignment recited consideration and the assignee filed the docu-
ment with the county clerk of the county in which the lease was located.
Following the assignment the operating company continued to pay the
IRA owner his 1% individually and the IRA the 2%. The second as-
signee notified the operating company of its claim. The operating com-
pany then interpled future payments and requested that the court
determine to whom the payments should be made. The second assignee
filed a motion for summary judgment, setting forth the chain of title, and
claiming that it owned all of the 3% interest. The trial court granted the
second assignee's motion for summary judgment and found that the sec-
ond assignee owned the disputed 2% interest that had previously been
owned in the IRA. The appeals court found that an IRA is the same as a
savings account since the beneficiary can control the investment and dis-
tribution of the IRA.140 The owner contended that he could not transfer
title to the mineral interests since he was merely a beneficiary of the trust.
He and the bank both contended that only the bank, as trustee, could
assign the mineral interests. The appeals court found that the bank
served merely as an administrator over the IRA assets, maintaining
records of account transactions and that the owner could transfer IRA
assets without any action of the bank.141
In Starcrest Trust v. Berry 42 the court held that the trial court did not
err when it found that the settlor/trustee of a revocable trust revoked the
trust when he executed a deed of trust on real property owned by the
trust to secure a personal loan. 143 The appellant' 44 sought to enjoin a
non-judicial foreclosure on real property held in trust, and also requested
a declaratory judgment that the lien created by the deed of trust was inva-
lid. The trial court temporarily enjoined the foreclosure. The appellee
then counterclaimed for repayment of the funds he allegedly loaned and
requested a judicial foreclosure. The evidence at trial showed that the
appellee loaned the funds to the trustee of the trust for the trustee's per-
sonal benefit. The trustee had a note and deed of trust prepared and
executed the documents in the name of trust. The trial court found that
the settlor/trustee revoked the trust by executing the deed of trust. The
trial court entered judgment against the appellant for the amount of the
loan plus attorney's fees and ordered a judicial foreclosure. The trustee
appealed. The appeals court found that the settlor/trustee executed the
140. Id. at 690 (citing In re Damas, 136 B.R. 11, 18 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991)).
141. Id. at 691. The court cited Lee v. Gutierrez, 876 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1994, writ denied), for the proposition that the bank was like a safe deposit box and
served merely as a repository and that the assets held in the IRA were like the contents of
the safe deposit box. Colvin, 920 S.W.2d at 691. Thus, the court reasoned, the owner could
determine what assets were held in the IRA just as he could have determined what assets
to place in a safe deposit box. Id
142. 926 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
143. Id. at 353.
144. The trustee of the trust filed for the injunction in the name of the trust rather than
in the name of the trustee.
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documents in his capacity as settlor rather than as trustee.145 The court
found that the deed of trust showed evidence of the settlor/trustee's in-
tent to revoke the trust, 146 and that the trial court did not err when it
found that the settlor/trustee revoked the trust.147 The court also found
that the trial court had jurisdiction over the counterclaim even though the
minor beneficiaries did not receive service or have ad litem representa-
tion.14 Finally, the court determined that the trial court did not err by
entering judgment against the trust rather than the trustee. 149
B. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
In Nowlin v. Frost National Bank'50 the court held that a trust benefici-
ary validly exercised a testamentary special power of appointment in
favor of two charities.' 5 ' The beneficiary's parents created two irrevoca-
ble trusts, one for the benefit of each of their sons, in 1981. The trust
agreements provided that each trust would terminate on the later of two
years following the death of the second of the settlors to die or the date
the beneficiary attained the age of thirty-five years. The trust agreements
gave the beneficiaries a testamentary special power of appointment to a
class that included relatives of the beneficiary and charities. The provi-
sion granting the special power of appointment stated that the exercise of
the power would be invalid if it attempted to force the trustee to dis-
tribute trust property to the appointee at any time prior to two years after
the death of the second of the settlors to die. The beneficiary's father
died in 1985 and the beneficiary died in 1992, survived by his mother and
brother. The beneficiary executed a will in which he purported to exer-
cise the special power of appointment in favor of two charities. The exer-
cise specifically referred to the special power of appointment in the trust
agreement. The beneficiary's brother contested the exercise of the spe-
cial power of appointment, alleging that it was invalid. The brother also
alleged that the trust provision creating the power of appointment was
ambiguous. The trial court found that the beneficiary validly exercised
145. Starcrest, 926 S.W.2d at 353. The court based its determination on TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 113.052(a)(1) (Vernon 1984), which provides that a trustee may not lend
trust funds to himself.
146. Starcrest, 926 S.W.2d at 353 (citing GEORGE G. BOGART, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 1001 (rev. 2d ed. 1983), which states that a settlor may revoke a trust by
conveying trust property to a third person).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 355-56. The court found that the settlor/trustee adequately represented his
children's interests at trial and that he did not have a conflict of interest with his minor
children. Id. at 355.
149. Id. at 356. The trustee argued that the appellee should not have counterclaimed
against the trust since it was not a legal entity, but the trustee did not raise this issue at
trial. The court found the trustee's argument raised a defect in the counterclaim pleading,
which the appeals court could not promote to a position of fundamental error. Id. Fur-
ther, the appellee merely named the same party in his counterclaim as was named in the
original suit. Because the settlor/trustee actively participated in the trial, the court found
that he had adequate notice. Id.
150. 908 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
151. Id. at 289.
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his power of appointment and his brother appealed. The appeals court
found no ambiguity in the language creating the special power of appoint-
ment.152 The court found that the language of the beneficiary's will did
not invalidate the power of appointment. 53 The court then found that
probate law did not require the immediate distribution of trust estate fol-
lowing the beneficiary's death, but instead gave the charities a vested in-
terest in the trust property subject to postponed possession.154 The court
found that the trust agreement controlled the distribution of the ap-
pointed property.' 55 The court held that the beneficiary validly executed
the special power of appointment and that the beneficiary did not at-
tempt to force the trustee to distribute trust property prior to the termi-
nation of the trust estate. 56
C. RESULTING TRUSTS
In Richardson v. Laney157 the court found that a resulting trust arose in
favor of the father when he transferred his home to two of his children
without consideration and without the intent to make a gift to the chil-
dren.158 After he began treatments for cancer the father deeded his
home and real estate to his daughter and one of his sons. He continued
to live in the home until his death. The son did not record the deed until
several days following his father's death. Following the father's death, a
will contest and other litigation arose concerning the father's estate. The
donee son and daughter contended that their father meant to give them
the home and real estate when he executed the deed. Some evidence
showed, however, that the father transferred the home in order to acquire
or maintain government entitlements. Further, the donee son stated in
pleadings he filed in the case that the real property was part of his fa-
ther's estate at the time of his death. The jury found that the father did
not intend to give the home and real estate to the donees. The appeals
court held that sufficient evidence existed to uphold the jury's finding.' 59
The appeals court then found that it could affirm the trial court's judg-
ment that the home and real estate were part of the father's estate by
imposing a resulting trust.' 60 The court found that the imposition of the
equitable remedy of resulting trust was appropriate when evidence ex-
isted that the father did not receive any consideration for the transfer and
152. Id. at 286. The court stated that any ambiguity was in the beneficiary's will, not in
the trust provision. Id.
153. Id. at 288. The exercise of the power of appointment in the will did not require the
trustee to distribute the appointed property prior to two years after the death of the bene-
ficiary's mother. See id. at 287-88.
154. Id. at 288.
155. Id. at 289.
156. Id.
157. 911 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ). For a discussion of the
other issue in this case see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.





that he did not intend to make a gift. 16 1
In Leighton v. Leighton 62 the court found that the fact that a husband
and wife executed a deed of trust on the husband's separate property did
not create a resulting trust in favor of the wife. 163 The husband acquired,
as the result of a distribution from a trust created by his parents, several
hundred acres. Shortly after the husband acquired the property he and
his wife married. The property was the husband's separate property. The
husband and wife later decided to homestead the property by building
their home there. In order to pay for the residence, the husband and wife
executed a promissory note payable to the builder, who secured payment
through a mechanic's lien on the property. The husband and wife later
borrowed the funds for paying the builder from a bank, executed a prom-
issory note payable to the bank, and executed a deed of trust securing
payment of the note. The couple separated some ten years later. The
wife continued to make payments on the promissory note and she also
paid taxes and insurance on the property. The wife contended at the di-
vorce trial that her husband gave her an interest in half of the property
when they decided to build their home. The husband denied making a
gift of any part of the property and stated that the wife executed loan
documents and the deed of trust only at the bank's insistence. No evi-
dence of a deed existed. The trial court determined that, by executing the
deed of trust, the couple conveyed the property to the trustee under the
deed of trust. The trial court found that the deed of trust created a result-
ing trust in the wife's favor and that the ranch was community property.
The trial court entered a judgment giving the husband and wife each an
undivided one-half interest in the property. The husband appealed. The
appeals court found that no authority existed for the imposition of a re-
sulting trust in the wife's favor merely because the couple executed a
deed of trust.164 The court held that a resulting trust did not arise when
the husband and wife executed a mortgage loan and deed of trust for
improvements to the husband's separate property. 165
161. Id. The court also found that sufficient evidence existed that the father did not
intend to make a gift of a certificate of deposit to the son and daughter. Id. at 494. Evi-
dence showed that the son withdrew part of the certificate to pay his father's funeral ex-
penses and that the father received all of the interest on the certificate of deposit until his
death. The certificate of deposit was held in the names of the son and daughter as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship. The certificate was purchased with funds from an ear-
lier certificate of deposit that initially was held in the father's name as trustee for the son
and daughter, but which the son later changed to remove the father as trustee and to place
just into his and his sister's names. The court found that the jury could have determined
that the father did not intend to make a gift based upon the evidence presented. Id.
162. 921 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
163. Id. at 368.
164. Id. The court noted that the appropriate remedy was the right to community reim-
bursement. Id. (citing Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1976, no writ)). The court, citing Bybee v. Bybee, 644 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ), stated that a resulting trust did not arise merely by using
community funds for payments on separate property. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d at 368.
165. Id.
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